Introductory Summary

Psyche-D Posts

There has recently been discussion of the issue of "appearances" versus "underlying reality". I believe correct resolution of this issue could turn out to be the first step toward development of an information processing theory able to explain how consciousness is produced.

Even so, effective analysis of the relationship between what Psyche-D posts have called the "dark world" (McKenzie 15-Dec-97, aka "underlying reality") and the private world each of our brains discretely construct from sensory input received from that dark world, probably will require development of a precise notation and a tightly structured initial case describing relevant information flows. Here is such a notation and initial case:

1)	Assume there exists independent of any observing subject, a single universe, U, which contains all things, including all human beings.
1a)	Any alternative to (1) would require adoption of an idealism or a solipsism.
2)	If it is accepted U exists in its own right, then a component of U - call it the noumenal world, W[r] - can then be defined, where W[r] is the observer-independent component of U.
2a)	W[r] will be the world underlying appearances but not including appearances. Thus, W[r] will be where information capable of sensory perception comes from, regardless of whether there are observers present to perceive that information. (I prefer to call W[r] the noumenal world because it essentially is U purely at the level of Kant's noumena (see "The Critique of Pure Reason" and, specifically, the Transcendental Aesthetic).)
3)	The component of a person that is manifest at the level of W[r] can be called their noumenal body, B[r].*
3a)	Similarly, there will be a component of a person's brain manifest at the level of W[r], call it brain[r]. Also, there will be trees[r], rocks[r], beetles[r] and so on. (These examples introduce use of the suffix [r] to denote the noumenal component of any entity or process.)
4)	A person's conscious experience of themselves as they act in the world will be generated by processes[r] in their brain[r] which inter alia use real-time sensory input flowing from W[r] into B[r]. Their brain[r] must use that sensory input to generate, for its internal purposes - including conscious sensory perception, and the conscious planning and execution of physical acts - a dynamic real-time representation of B[r] in W[r] which can be called B[i] in W[i]. Call W[i] the world image and call B[i] the body image.
4a)	Your B[i] will be your body as you consciously perceive it, and W[i] will be the world you perceive as containing your body and all other physical things. Thus, importantly W[i] will be what you refer to as "the physical world". W[i] will contain your brain[i], and also trees[i], rocks[i], beetles[i] and so on. (These examples introduce use of the suffix [i] to denote the phenomenal component of any entity or process. Note that any entity[r] will lead to a subjectively perceived entity[i] unique to each observer. Thus, in the presence of a table[r], what you see as the table will be your table[i] and what I see will be my table[i]. (A distinction of this type was made in McKenzie 24-Dec-97).)

The idea that conscious experience of the self-in-the-world must rely on brain[r] generating a real-time representation of B[r] in W[r] is logically necessary:-

Consider the following example: View the ceiling over your head. You know that you are able to see the ceiling only because light travels from it into your eyes, where incoming light patterns are then translated into neural impulses. But if that is true, how can the ceiling appear subjectively to you to be outside and above your head, rather than inside your brain, where those neural impulses are being processed? The reason can only be that information[r] is passing from ceiling[r] via your eyes[r], into your brain[r], where it is being processed such that you subjectively can experience that information as ceiling[i] which you perceive as being some distance outside and above your head[i]. The only efficient explanation can be that, the whole time, head[i] and ceiling[i] are inside W[i] which, at the level of information processing, must be inside your brain[r]. (W[i] is inside your brain[r] by virtue of having been generated by your brain[r], within your brain[r], through brain[r] processing of sensory input[r].)

The initial case provided above forms a departure point for a host of separate analyses, some more to do with metaphysics than with consciousness. In relation to consciousness, one particularly interesting direction is:

5)	If a person consciously experiences themselves in real time as B[i] in W[i] then there must be a set of processes in brain[r] which maintain in real time a high level of fidelity between the image level (phenomenal level) of B[i] in W[i] and the noumenal level of B[r] in W[r].
5a)	That must be so, otherwise a person's capacity for normal sensory-motor coordination would fail. Why would it fail? Because each physical action we make must first occur at the noumenal level of B[r] acting upon W[r], and then be followed, on a second-by-second basis, with monitoring at the level of B[i] in W[i] for confirmation that the action is proceeding as planned. If something is seen to be going wrong with the action as it is reflected in B[i] in W[i], then conscious correction of that action can take place. Thus, as suggested, if in real time the dynamic representation B[i] in W[i] did not with adequate fidelity reflect the dynamic situation of B[r] in W[r] we would be unable to practice effective sensory-motor coordination.
6)	If there is a process in brain[r] responsible for maintaining real-time fidelity between B[i] in W[i] and B[r] in W[r], then that process may have a refresh rate, or perhaps even a refresh frequency. That is, there may be a frequency with which B[i] in W[i] is updated to reflect changes in B[r] in W[r]. (Although that rate seems unlikely to be as fast as Professor Crick's 40 Hertz (40 times per second), it could be an integral fraction of 40 Hertz, possibly 10 Hertz (see below).)**

How might all of this lead to a description of the processes by which consciousness itself is generated? Well, consider the following:

7)	A subjective, moment-by-moment sense of consciousness may be generated through an error-correction process in brain[r] which at a rate of about 10 Hertz realigns (i.e. error corrects) a person's B[i] in W[i] (the physical world as they perceive it) to update it back to high fidelity (i.e. to bring it back into "register") with their B[r] in W[r] (the world as they act upon it).
7a)	The genesis of consciousness might then take place at about 10 Hertz**, when each realignment to bring B[i] in W[i] back to high fidelity with B[r] in W[r] leads to the possibility of an information processing arrangement in brain[r] able operationally to assume that B[i] in W[i] is in identity with B[r] in W[r].

In other words, consider that, on a moment-by-moment basis, consciousness might arise through brain[r] processes which manipulate information on the operational premise that the self as it perceives itself (B[i] in W[i]) is one and the same as the self as it acts (B[r] in W[r]).

A derivative of what I am proposing then, is that it will be a necessary condition of consciousness that a person will be incapable of any immediate form of subjective awareness of a distinction between their body as they perceive it (their B[i]) and their body as it acts (their B[r]).*** And, indeed, experience shows that an utter lack of ability to distinguish B[i] from B[r] is the norm. (That is why the initial case provided above in points (1) to (4) is not self evident, and can only be shown to be necessary by application of sustained abstract reasoning.)

A further observation in support of deriving points (7) and (7a) from (6) is that consciousness itself appears subjectively to have a rate. We cannot easily consciously perceive the slow movement of the big hand on a clock or see the fast flight of a bullet. But we do see the movement of a clock's second hand quite well, and if it has a stepped movement we subjectively can mark each second as it passes. Using an analogue stop watch with a stepped movement though, it is very difficult consciously to mark the passage of each tenth second. That rough "titration" of capacity for subjective awareness of shorter and shorter frequencies of movement, supports the idea that brain[r] processes responsible for consciousness have a summed rate within an order of magnitude of a tenth of a second.

(Reasoning behind that assertion includes that any system which has a frequency x, can interact in a complex manner with systems which impinge upon it and have a frequency comparable to x, but can interact only crudely - if at all - with those impinging systems which have a rate either much greater or smaller than x.)

Points (7) and (7a) may seem farfetched. There is a properly reasoned case to be made for them [which is made in the Main Essay available on this website], but it is much too long to post to Psyche-D. Meanwhile, I hope that in their bald state (7) and (7a) will prove stimulating.


I will begin with a point 8, since these points extend Hammer (27-Dec). They lead on directly from point (4a) above, and relate to issues touched upon in the recent thread, "Consciousness". They particularly relate to McKenzie (16-Dec).

8)	When people, including scientists, refer to the physical world, what we are referring to is that which we collectively agree to be the contents of our respective W[i]s.
8a)	We reach agreement on the contents of our respective W[i]s by use of language and, for quantitative purposes, by use of agreed measuring procedures.
8b)	We can reach collective agreement on the contents of our respective W[i]s not only because our respective B[r]s each inhabit and receive sensory input[r] from the same (and the only) W[r], but because each of our brain[r]s probably have similar mechanisms[r] and structures[r] for processing[r] that sensory input to form those respective W[i]s.
8c)	Thus, through collective agreement, we form a view of ourselves as inhabiting a single, shared physical environment. In other words, whomever you are, you believe that the physical world you experience - your W[i] - is one and the same, by agreed measuring procedures and by all perceived contents, as the physical world which all others experience (i.e. their respective W[i]s).

Again, W[r] remains the foundation. It is important however, to recognise that our physics, and the rest of our collectively agreed knowledge of the physical world, consists of a collective agreement about what makes up the contents of our respective W[i]s.

That collective agreement will powerfully reinforce our intuition that what we perceive really is in identity with what is "out there" in W[r]. That reinforcement will exist regardless of how much of what we collectively agree to be the contents of our respective W[i]s is in fact a collectively experienced artifact of the neurological architecture[r] and processing arrangements[r] common to each of our brain[r]s as they go about generating our respective consciousnesses.

Duncan McKenzie (28-Dec) asked:

How do we represent the function that describes the relationship between object[r] and object[i]?

I believe this to be an important and fundamental question. In short, I think it likely that we cannot know what the function is, but that we can know what the function is designed to achieve, and how well it is achieving it.

I believe McKenzie's function is being refined by evolutionary forces acting on B[r], to develop brain[r]'s capacity to produce a sense of consciousness of one's self as a B[i] in W[i], such that that B[i] in W[i] converges on the most operationally efficient (that is what I have meant by highest fidelity) representation possible of B[r] in W[r]. Operationally efficient, in the sense that conscious experience of yourself as B[i] in W[i] will effectively be a working hypothesis of the situation of your B[r] in W[r] - a working hypothesis upon which you will predicate all of the conscious, voluntary physical actions which you make.

If the "hypothesis" which is your experience of yourself as B[i] in W[i] fails, (i.e. if Duncan's "function" proves inadequate) sensory-motor coordination errors will occur. Duncan also wrote:

An object[i] derives from an object[r] in World[r]. But object[i] also has an existence in World[r]. How do we notate this?

In the arrangement I have described, an object[i] can only arise as a part of the contents of a W[i] being experienced by a particular conscious B[r]. To that extent, the relationship between an object[i] and object[r] can only be one where object[r] is the source of information[r] received by the senses[r] of the B[r] in question, and where that information[r] is used by that B[r]'s brain[r] processes in generating that B[r]'s conscious experience of itself as a B[i] in W[i]. In that way B[r] can be conscious of object[i] as part of the contents of its W[i]. Only through that process can an object[r] be connected to an object[i].

A further question was:

Is there a limit as to what objects in World[r] can be discussed - including through use of this notation?

Apart from the complex issue of whether there is such a thing as space[r] (Hammer 30-Dec), I think that provided an object[i] exists for one or more observers it can be discussed as either having (or, in the case of a hallucination, not having) a counterpart object[r]. An object[r] usually can only be inferred from the perception of an object[i].

Even so, the possibility of objects[r] and processes[r] which cannot be perceived as objects[i] or processes[i] makes for interesting analysis. Indeed, postulating that certain objects[r] and processes[r] must exist, despite the fact that those objects[r] and processes[r] may be incapable of direct perception as objects[i] or processes[i] is what much of modern science seems to be about.

For example, no chemist of any standing would now seriously propose that atoms do not exist. But there are no such things as atoms[i] - they are just too small to perceive directly. Hence, the leap which is made when scientists choose to perform experiments on the basis that atoms exist, really does seem to be made on the basis that atoms[r] exist. (And, of course, the way in which experimental results have been used cumulatively to reinforce the hypothesis that atoms[r] exist, despite the absence of atoms[i], would make a study in its own right.)

Moreover, and in respect of the issue of space (Hammer 30-Dec), I consider it important that a number of those entities[r] which are now considered indispensable to physical theory and which cannot be directly observed as entities[i] are realised to be incapable of being understood if the scientists working on them use theories which treat space in a way which is consistent with the version of space which we seem consciously to encounter as we experience ourselves as a B[i] in W[i].

Specifically, I have in mind long-distance quantum entangled systems, systems involving delocalised subatomic particles (e.g. systems where tunneling occurs), instantaneous changes and indeterminacies in the quantum states of subatomic and other particles, and the viability of entities such as the event horizon on black holes.


As a demonstration of the explanatory power of ideas described in Hammer (27-Dec and 1-Jan), the purpose of this post is to show how they can be used to solve a classical form of the Mind-Body Problem (CMBP).

The CMBP asks for an explanation of the relationship between "physical events" and "mental events". Mental events have been characterised as including such things as emotions and desires, which are considered to take place privately and "within" a person. Physical events have been characterised as things which can publicly be observed, and which take place in what is commonly referred to as the "physical world". More simply, in the CMBP any event which a person consciously experiences and which they cannot ascribe to the physical world is called a mental event.

Here is how ideas from Hammer (27-Dec and 1-Jan) explain the CMBP.
First, consider the previously presented points:

4a)	Your B[i] will be your body as you consciously perceive it, and W[i] will be the world you perceive as containing your body and all other physical things. Thus, importantly, W[i] will be what you refer to as "the physical world".
8)	When people, including scientists, refer to the "physical world", what they are referring to is that which we collectively agree to be the contents of our respective W[i]s.
8a)	We reach agreement on the contents of our respective W[i]s by use of language and, for quantitative purposes, by use of agreed measuring procedures.

Those points can be extended as follows:

9)	Assume that for each B[r], consciousness is generated by a specific information processing system[r] within their brain[r]. Call that information processing system[r], D[r].
9a)	As (4a) describes, the form in which the physical world will present itself to a person's consciousness will be as their B[i] in W[i]. Now, in the hypothesis being described, conscious perception of the self as B[i] in W[i] will be generated within brain[r] - including by operations[r] of D[r] - through brain[r] processing of sensory information[r] coming to brain[r] via sensory pathways[r] from W[r]. Call that incoming sensory information[r], s.
10)	The apparent "non-physical" character of mental events can then be explained by assuming that brain[r] does not only pass s into D[r], but also passes D[r] other information. Call that other information "non-sensory information[r]" or o. Thus, input to D[r] of o would create the possibility of a person consciously perceiving more than B[i] in W[i].
10a)	A person's conscious perceptions due to o input to D[r] would have to appear to them to be non-physical - that is, "mental" - in character, because such conscious perceptions could not form part of the contents of their B[i] in W[i]. Contents of their consciousness due to o could not be perceived as part of the contents of their B[i] in W[i] because their B[i] in W[i] will be generated by brain[r] processing of s, not of o. And recall from (4a) that it is B[i] in W[i] which a person consciously perceives to be the physical world.
10b)	Recall also (8-8a) that when all of us discuss the "physical world", what we are referring to is that which we collectively agree to be the contents of our respective W[i]s. That will mean that in discussion with others of our conscious perceptions due to o input, we will be unable to refer to such perceptions as being physical in nature.

Certainly it will be possible to attribute such perceptions to neurological[r] events[r], which scientists can study as collectively agreed contents of a set of respectively observed neurological[i] events[i]. But that would be to describe a basis or "cause" for the perceptions and not - as is meant here - to describe those perceptions as they actually are consciously experienced.

Such perceptions therefore will have to be referred to as non-physical - that is, as "mental". By that reckoning, desires, emotions and other mental events, such as pains, would be examples of contents of conscious generated through D[r] processing of o input.


Roland Cook (4-Jan) asked:

What does "physical" signify, e.g. as used by Hammer?

An important implicit aspect of my recent posts has been to try to show that the term "physical" is not as simple as it seems, and that for the term "physical" properly to be understood it needs to be analysed using an appropriate notation along with a carefully considered account of how sensory information[r] is likely to arise and be transformed by a B[r]'s brain[r] in the course its experiencing conscious awareness of being in a "physical" environment.

In my account three "physical" "levels" (for want of a better word) enter into consideration.

The first level is the noumenal world, W[r], defined at points (2-2a) in Hammer 27-Dec:

2a)	W[r] will be the world underlying appearances but not including appearances. Thus, W[r] will be where information capable of sensory perception comes from, regardless of whether there are observers present to perceive that information.

There is only one W[r] containing all people[r], i.e. all B[r], and all other things[r] able to be perceived as things[i]. (This level corresponds to what McKenzie (15-Dec) called the "dark world".)

The second level is the world image, W[i], defined in Hammer 27-Dec:

4)	A person's conscious experience of themselves as they act in the world will be generated by processes[r] in their brain[r] which inter alia use real-time sensory input flowing from W[r] into B[r]. Their brain[r] must use that sensory input to generate, for its internal purposes - including conscious sensory perception, and the conscious planning and execution of physical acts - a dynamic real-time representation of B[r] in W[r] which can be called B[i] in W[i]. Call W[i] the world image and call B[i] the body image.
4a)	Your B[i] will be your body as you consciously perceive it, and W[i] will be the world you perceive as containing your body and all other physical things. Thus, importantly W[i] will be what you refer to as "the physical world". W[i] will contain your brain[i], and also trees[i], rocks[i], beetles[i] and so on.

Each conscious person, i.e. each B[r], will experience their own unique B[i] in W[i]. (This level corresponds to what McKenzie (15-Dec) called the "Perceived World".)

The third, and most abstracted level, can be called W[z]. W[z] was implicit in points (8-8c) of Hammer 1-Jan:

"When people, including scientists, refer to the "physical world", what we are referring to is that which we collectively agree to be the contents of our respective W[i]s. We reach agreement on the contents of our respective W[i]s by use of language and, for quantitative purposes, by use of agreed measuring procedures...

Thus, through collective agreement, we form a view of ourselves as inhabiting a single, shared physical environment. In other words, whomever you are, you believe that the physical world you experience - your W[i] - is one and the same, by agreed measuring procedures and by all perceived contents, as the physical world which all others experience (i.e. their respective W[i]s)."

So W[z] is the "physical world" as it is collectively acknowledged. Thus, in its highest (most sophisticated and integrated form) W[z] is the physical world as it is articulated in the literature of the physical and biological sciences. This level corresponds to what McKenzie (15-Dec) called the "Group World".

Roland's core question was:

"Is consciousness physical?"

In my view all of the information, information processing, and information processing structures needed for the genesis of consciousness will exist at the level of W[r]. In other words, consciousness will be created by flows of information[r], by information processing[r] and through information processing structures[r], probably largely occurring within individual brain[r]s.

So the answer to Roland's question, at least from my perspective, is that consciousness is physical insofar as I would maintain that consciousness is generated entirely by processes[r] taking place in W[r]. But there are some further important points to be made in this area.

To begin with, in the arrangement I have proposed, nobody can have direct conscious access to flows of information[r], information processing[r], information processing structures[r] or other noumenal entities[r] in W[r]. Indeed, any explanation of the "physical" basis for the genesis of consciousness can only be achieved in the form of articulation at the level of W[z].

In terms of neurophysiological study, what this means is that each individual scientist studying brain information processing will be studying information processing[i] in brains[i] which she/he will have access to only in the form of the contents[i] of her/his (the scientists') respective W[i]. Then, in comparing and reaching progressive agreement on their respective investigative techniques[i], and respective findings[i], those scientists will build up a body of knowledge which will form the agreed corpus of brain-relevant knowledge in W[z].

A key question then arising is whether it will be possible to build a theory based on agreed reasoning techniques and W[z]-level agreed observations which can explain what it is like to feel oneself to be conscious and to have subjective experience of the contents of one's consciousness.

Such a theory ought to entail an explanation of how qualia arise, and indeed, how all of what is subjectively experienced as "physical" can arise.

In other words, the theory ought to be able to tell you how your brain can pull off the trick of making you feel and experience what it feels like to be you from the "inside". (i.e. the theory should solve David Chalmers's "hard problem".)

Bearing that in mind, I would make the general assertion, at the level of possible structures of theories of consciousness, that if it is decided the ideas in my 27-Dec and 2-Jan posts can be discarded, and that the different layers of what I have meant by "physical" can be collapsed by:

a)	setting W[r] at objective identity to any W[i] (i.e. saying that the idea of W[i] is irrelevant)

and thereby saying

b)	W[z] is an agreed description based on direct observation of W[r]

or by assuming that

c)	W[z] and W[r] are the same thing (an assumption McKenzie 15-Dec identifies as a common source of confusion)

then it will not be possible to derive out of those theories how there can be subjective experience such that there is such a thing as what it feels like to be you from the inside.

The reason subjective experience will not be able to be derived using such collapsed theories is that the possibility of explaining the reality of conscious, subjective experience of the self as a "physical" being in a "physical" world, will be eliminated once the idea of a subjective level, B[i] in W[i], is itself eliminated.

In practical terms, lack of the B[i] in W[i] level in a theory of consciousness will mean the theory would lack any "place" for information states and flows, and information processing systems understood empirically at the level of W[z] (brain states and structures), to be "translated onto" to form a predicted series of subjective experiences.

Thus, scientists could conceivably learn all of the information processing pathways and activities taking place in a typical human brain, (and even learn empirically what types of neural activity "caused" what types of subjective states), but still be unable to arrive at a theory of how the whole empirical, neurological ensemble gets operationally translated into a personal, self-centred subjective experience of the world, including experience of "physical" and "mental" events (as those terms were used in Hammer 2-Jan).

Brendon Hammer
January 1998

The complete and considerably more extensive set of original posts are available here. They can also be sourced under the mail name XAMMEP, beginning 27 December 1997, under "Worlds and Consciousness" in the two files psyche-d.log9712 and psyche-d.log9801, downloadable from:

http://archive.org/details/PSYCHE-D

These files can be opened using the free text editor Notepad++.